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Profit-Split Method: Time for Countries to Apply 
A Standardized Approach
by Jeffery M. Kadet, Tommaso Faccio, and Sol Picciotto
Now that the OECD has issued its final 
guidance on the action 10 profit-split method,1 
individual countries must determine how they 
might consider and apply the profit-split method.
It’s true that some countries have large and 
well-staffed transfer pricing audit groups that 
include economists and other tax professionals 
knowledgeable in the application of transfer 
pricing principles and rules. However, those 
resources are never enough to match the legions of 
specialists that can be deployed by large 
multinational groups.
The situation is even worse elsewhere. Most 
countries not only have significant resource and 
personnel constraints, but they also simply do not 
have the internal expertise to effectively apply 
transfer pricing rules to the multiple industries in 
which multinational groups operate. For those 
countries, applying the complex and subjective 
transfer pricing rules, including analyzing and 
understanding accurately delineated controlled 
transactions as contemplated by the OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines, is simply not an option.2
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1
OECD, “Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional 
Profit-Split Method: Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Action 10” (2018).
2
Paragraph 58 of the revised guidance provides an excellent example 
of how complex and subjective any application of the guidelines can be. 
This paragraph provides a “note” that accompanies Example 11. It states, 
in part:
The example is intended to exemplify in a simple manner the 
mechanisms of a residual profit split and should not be interpreted as 
providing general guidance as to how the arm’s length principle 
should apply in identifying arm’s length comparables and 
determining an appropriate split. It is important that the principles 
that it seeks to illustrate are applied in each case taking into account 
the specific facts and circumstances of the case. In particular, it should 
be noted that the allocation of the residual profit may need 
considerable refinement in practice in order to identify and quantify 
the appropriate basis for the split. Where R&D expenditure is used, 
differences in the types of R&D conducted may need to be taken into 
account, e.g. because different types of R&D may have different 
levels of risk associated with them, which would lead to different 
levels of expected returns at arm’s length. Relative levels of current 
R&D expenditure also may not adequately reflect the contribution to 
the earning of current profits that is attributable to intangible 
property developed or acquired in the past.
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There is an important reason why tax 
authorities in both developing and developed 
countries will push for wider use of the profit-
split method. A common mechanism in many 
profit-shifting structures is to allocate to local 
group members a low routine return, leaving all 
residual profits in members located in countries 
where those profits will be subject to zero or low 
tax. We expect that tax authorities in countries 
experiencing those tax losses will try to widen the 
application of the profit-split method, using the 
OECD’s final guidance to identify the method as 
the most suitable in many circumstances.3
That creates a conundrum. On the one hand, 
through both traditional audit procedures and 
risk assessments allowed by country-by-country 
reporting, tax authorities worldwide will identify 
an increasing number of situations for which the 
profit-split method is the most appropriate. On 
the other hand, developing countries, as well as 
many developed countries, simply do not have 
the resources to apply transfer pricing methods as 
contemplated by the guidelines.
An approach to applying the profit-split 
method that avoids resource-consuming 
applications under the guidelines, and the 
required analysis and understanding of every 
group situation that involves evident transfer 
pricing risk, is sorely needed. Further, the current 
ad hoc approach relies on subjective judgments, 
which creates enormous uncertainty for 
taxpayers. The approach must be predictable and 
reduce disputes between taxpayers and tax 
authorities.
The OECD final guidance represents a 
consensus that included input from the countries 
that are members of the inclusive framework on 
base erosion and profit shifting. The requirement 
for consensus inevitably means that the guidance 
can reflect only the lowest common denominator 
of country positions. Hence, it is unsurprising that 
the final guidance does not include innovative 
proposals, such as one from the BEPS Monitoring 
Group that the OECD and other interested parties 
should make the profit-split method easy for 
taxpayers and tax authorities to apply by 
establishing standardized, concrete allocation keys 
and weightings for common business models.
The final guidance lists weaknesses of the 
profit-split method that would be faced in its 
application, including the need to measure 
relevant revenue and costs of the applicable group 
members. As examples, the guidance says 
applying the profit-split method “could require 
stating books and records on a common basis and 
making adjustments in accounting practices and 
currencies.” It goes on to state that “it may be 
difficult to identify the appropriate operating 
expenses associated with the transactions and to 
allocate costs between the transactions and the 
associated enterprises’ other activities.” It also 
points out that identifying appropriate profit-
splitting factors could be challenging.
The accounting issues and cost allocations will 
require work and the application of judgment. But 
that work and decision-making pales in 
comparison with the subjectivity and difficulty of 
accurately delineating controlled transactions, 
finding relevant comparables, and addressing the 
almost inevitable ensuing disputes and litigation 
between taxpayers and authorities.
Further, even in applying other transfer 
pricing methods, determining relevant revenues 
and costs must be performed as part of the 
required functional and other economic analyses. 
It is surely not too much to hope that the 
specialists of leading OECD and inclusive 
framework members could work with the OECD 
staff to produce helpful guidance that would 
benefit all.
Also, the weakness of identifying appropriate 
profit-splitting factors ad hoc will simply fall 
away when standardized keys and weightings for 
common business models are applied.
We have suggested that interested parties 
work together to develop standardized, concrete 
allocation keys and weightings for common 
business models. In the absence of jointly 
developed keys and weightings:
• individual countries or regional groups 
could develop standardized, concrete keys 
and weightings to be used for their area’s 
common business models;
• such keys and weightings could be 
implemented through sectoral advance 
pricing arrangements developed in 
3
See Google India Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Director of Income Tax, combined 
appeals (ITAT Bangalore 2018)).
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consultation with relevant industry 
associations; and
• all such keys and weightings should be 
made public, which would increase 
transparency, eliminate the risk of 
sweetheart tax deals, and encourage other 
countries and regional groups to adopt 
them for their common business models.
As examples of common business models, 
many multinational groups conduct production 
and sales through global supply chains. Further, 
many groups earn revenue from internet-based 
platforms and other digital businesses that supply 
user access to advertisers and others desiring 
contact with or information about the users. Other 
groups, including those with supply chain 
structures, use software platforms to sell their 
own and third-party products.
Countries could not only establish 
standardized, concrete allocation keys and 
weightings for common business models, but 
could also require that any groups whose 
businesses reflect those common business models 
must use the profit-split method, as well as the 
approved keys and weightings. Another method 
or alternative keys and weightings could be used 
only when a taxpayer establishes to the tax 
authority’s satisfaction that doing so is more 
appropriate. Hence, this profit-split method 
approach, including any sectoral APAs, would be 
on an opt-out basis when the facts and 
circumstances warrant it.
The suggestion that countries could move to 
standardize the use of the profit-split method 
reflects the reality that most multinationals 
operate under one centrally directed worldwide 
management. That management coordinates and 
directs not only the group’s overall direction and 
policies but also the specific day-to-day activities 
of each member in carrying out the business of the 
group, which is typically presented as seamless to 
all third parties (for example, raw material 
suppliers, vendors, customers, internet platform 
users, and advertisers). Also, the activities 
conducted in each location typically represent 
integral portions of the group’s worldwide 
business that truly add to its earning power and 
value; they are not independently run local 
operations that stand on their own.
When a country adopts an approach requiring 
some common business models to use the profit-
split method and the standardized keys and 
weightings, a taxpayer wanting to use a different 
method, keys, or weightings would have the 
burden of proof to show that its choice is in fact 
more appropriate. Local authorities would have 
to understand and analyze the accurately 
delineated controlled transactions only when a 
taxpayer claimed that another transfer pricing 
method or other keys and weightings should be 
used. Equally, taxpayers would be able to rely on 
the prescribed method, keys, and weightings, 
which would dispense with the need for a small 
army of specialists to devise transactional transfer 
pricing methods and produce the detailed 
documentation needed to defend them in case of 
audit.
The approach can be used for both traditional 
brick-and-mortar and highly digitized business 
models, because appropriate allocation keys and 
weightings can be identified to reflect the 
differences among models.4
A prime benefit of adopting this approach is 
the relative certainty of treatment that taxpayers 
clamor for. Yes, there will still be some judgment 
calls and potential audits regarding the applicable 
revenues and expenses to include in the combined 
profits that are subject to the profit-split method. 
However, those decisions and audits will be little 
different from the many others that all taxpayers 
and tax authorities face.
When a tax treaty applies such that a mutual 
agreement procedure might be implemented, 
using relevant and supportable keys and 
weightings for a common business model should 
help focus discussions and resolve competent 
authority disputes.
Some observers and critics will claim that this 
standardized approach is too simplistic and does 
not adequately reflect the differences among 
groups and how they conduct business. Even so, 
the fact remains that most countries have neither 
the resources nor the manpower to apply the 
complicated and subjective OECD guidelines to 
4
For more details about the approach, see prior OECD BEPS 
Monitoring Group submissions (available at https://
www.bepsmonitoringgroup.org); and Jeffery M. Kadet, “Expansion of 
the Profit-Split Method: The Wave of the Future,” Tax Notes Int’l, Mar. 30, 
2015, p. 1183. Those documents include several examples of concrete 
allocation keys and weightings as applied to several common business 
models.
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any material portion of the multinationals doing 
business within their borders.
As the guidelines themselves point out, 
transfer pricing is not an exact science. Despite 
this, the guidelines attempt to achieve 
theoretically correct results in a terribly subjective 
and complex environment. Seeking those results, 
however, imposes high costs on taxpayers and 
impossible burdens on tax authorities. A truly 
simple approach applied to actual combined 
profits that provides reasonable results fair to 
both taxpayers and tax authorities is sorely 
needed, and a balance between fair results and 
ease of application must be found.
It is time for individual countries and regional 
groups to consider adopting that approach. 
Countries should also consider encouraging the 
Platform for Collaboration on Tax, made up of the 
OECD, U.N., World Bank, and IMF, to further 
develop the approach so that it could more easily 
be adopted by many countries.
Finally, it is clear that the work on tax 
consequences of the digital economy centers not 
only on the definition of taxable presence, but 
also, and more importantly, on criteria for 
allocating profit. The G-20/OECD Task Force on 
the Digital Economy clearly needs to address 
questions raised about value creation in the 
digital economy, particularly by users of web 
platforms.5 The increased use of the profit-split 
method based on standardized allocation keys 
and weightings for common business models 
could help ensure that any solutions developed 
for the tax consequences of digitization do not 
target a separate sector but can instead be 
assimilated to strengthen the transfer pricing 
framework as a whole.6 
5
See the BEPS Monitoring Group’s submission on the tax challenges 
of digitization proposing a holistic approach that recognizes the value of 
users in the digital economy. That submission comments, in part:
The main changes due to digitalization are (i) the closer 
relationship it both requires and enables between producers and 
consumers; (ii) the digital services that are often supplied with no 
direct charge to users, while their inputs are monetised through 
revenue generated through services provided to other customers, 
especially advertising; and (iii) the ability that digitalisation gives 
for some firms to recharacterise themselves as pure intermediaries 
between producers and consumers.
See in particular the discussion beginning on p. 8 of this submission, 
which concludes on p. 10 by stating, “the user base constitutes an asset, 
although not usually shown in the balance sheet. Hence, it could be 
taken into consideration in calculating the asset factor if one is used in 
the formula for allocating profits.”
6
For an in-depth review of the BEPS action 1 history and recent 
developments concerning taxation of the digital economy, see Monica 
Gianni, “OECD BEPS (In)Action 1: Factor Presence as a Solution to Tax 
Issues of the Digital Economy,” 72 Tax Law. ___ (forthcoming 2018). This 
article includes a proposal for a “factor presence standard” that is 
conceptually similar to what this article is suggesting for the profit-split 
method.
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